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Perpetuating the Impermanence
of Foster Children: A Critical Analysis of
Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children
VIVEK SANKARAN*
I. Introduction
Seven-year-old Tasha entered the Michigan foster care system along
with her three older siblings due to drug use by their mother. Immediately
upon their removal, the Department of Human Services (DHS) placed the
children in an emergency shelter while family placements were being
explored. Two relatives emerged and expressed their willingness to care
for the children. The first, a maternal grandmother living in Michigan, had
space for the three older children and the court quickly placed the children
there after holding an emergency hearing. The other resource, Tasha's
paternal aunt, had a spacious four-bedroom townhouse at which Tasha
had spent summers and holidays. Tasha was eager to leave the emergency
shelter and live with her aunt, and everyone, including the judge, the
lawyer-guardian ad litem,' and the Michigan DHS caseworker, supported
the move. Yet, five months after the older siblings had left, Tasha was still
at the shelter, depressed and confused about why she remained away from
her aunt. Her bags were packed, and she was ready to leave but no one
could tell her when that would occur. Those working with her felt power-
* Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Child
Advocacy Law Clinic.
1. Under Michigan law, a lawyer-guardian ad litem (L-GAL) tasked with representing the
best interests of the child is appointed in every child protective proceeding. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 712A. 17d (2006). The L-GAL's duties include conducting an independent investigation, meet-
ing with the child, and taking all steps necessary to protect the child's best interest. Id.
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less to expedite the placement, and her impermanence manifested itself in
behavioral and academic problems.2 Tasha's permanency was held
hostage because her aunt lived in another state. Under the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC or the Compact), a uniform
law enacted in every state, before Tasha could be moved, a home assess-
ment needed to be conducted and the placement approved by the state in
which Tasha's aunt resided. Until that occurred, the little child's future
was simply placed on hold.
The importance of expediting the placement of foster children into per-
manent homes has emerged as a dominant theme in child welfare policy.'
Identifying and finalizing legally secure placements provides children
with psychological stability and a sense of belonging, and limits the like-
lihood of future disruptions of familial relationships.4 Upon a child's entry
into foster care, child welfare agencies, under both federal and state laws,
are compelled to develop a detailed plan to ensure a child's prompt place-
ment into such a home.5 If a parent is unable to rectify the conditions caus-
ing the child's placement in foster care within a year, a court is required
to consider other permanent options for the child.6 States are also permit-
ted to develop concurrent placement plans to ensure that children achieve
2. See Julian Libow, The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children-A Critical
Analysis, 43 Juv. AND FAM. CT. J. 19, 22 (1992) (observing that "[i]n some cases children suf-
fer gross detriment while waiting. The reasons can be manifold with many variables, including
but not limited to: age, preexisting emotional problems, inadequate foster home, and feelings of
abandonment. As the waiting time increases, the detriment becomes more aggravated.").
3. The recognition that "all children need safe, permanent, loving families that nurture,
protect and guide them," was at the heart of the work conducted by the Pew Commission on
Children in Foster Care, an independent, nonpartisan entity dedicated to developing effective
and practical policy recommendations to improve the foster care system. In their comprehen-
sive report titled, FOSTERING THE FUTURE: SAFETY, PERMANENCY AND WELL-BEING FOR
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, the Commission outlined the devastating consequences for foster
children of impermanence, including emotional, behavioral, and academic challenges. For
example, one young foster child told members of the Commission that he checked his belongings
every day in anticipation of another move. The report is available at http://pewfostercare.org/
research/docs/FinalReport.pdf.
4. See Donald N. Duquette, Establishing Legal Permanence for the Child, in CHILD
WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE 363 (2005).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 675 (1) (defining "case plan" to include an assurance that "the child
receives safe and proper care and that services are provided to the parents, child, and foster par-
ents in order to improve the conditions in the parents' home, facilitate return of the child to his
own safe home or the permanent placement of the child."); Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.13a
(2006) ("If the court orders placement of the juvenile outside the juvenile's home.., the agency
has the responsibility to prepare an initial services plan within 30 days of the juvenile's place-
ment."); Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19a (2) (2006) ("The court shall conduct a permanency
planning hearing within 30 days after there is a judicial determination that reasonable efforts to
reunite the child and family are not required.").
6. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006) ("[N]o later than 12 months after the date the child is
considered to have entered foster care, [the Court] shall determine the permanency plan for the
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permanency even if their parents fail.7 The paramount need for perma-
nency has created momentum to reexamine laws preventing children from
forming permanent relationships with caring adults and impeding their
exit from foster care. Unnecessary, protracted stays in foster care contra-
vene the consensus view that the child welfare system is not suited to
serve as a long-term surrogate parent for children.
8
One area in which the permanency needs of children remain subordi-
nate to bureaucratic impediments is the interstate placement of foster
children. The median time spent in the foster care system by children in
child that includes whether, and if applicable when, the child will be returned to the parent,
placed for adoption, and the State will file a petition for termination of parental rights, or referred
for legal guardianship, or... placed in another planned permanent living arrangement."); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 712A. 19a(l)(6) (2006) ("If a child remains in foster care and parental rights to
the child have not been terminated, the court shall conduct a permanency planning hearing with-
in 12 months after the child was removed from his or her home .... If the court determines at
a permanency planning hearing that the child should not be returned to his or her parent, the
court shall order the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights to the child.").
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(F) (2006) ("[R]easonable efforts to place a child for adoption
or with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts" to reunify the family).
8. The foster care system should be seen as a place of last resort for children. Over half a
million children remain in the system, and each year more children enter foster care than exit it.
See Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., The AFCARS Report: Interim FY 2003 Estimates as of
June 2006 (2006) at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/tar/report
10.htm. Social workers and attorneys handling these cases are overwhelmed. See THE ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUNDATION, THE UNSOLVED CHALLENGE OF SYSTEM REFORM: THE CONDITIONS OF THE
FRONTLINE HUMAN SERVICE WORKFORCE (2003) (observing that the annual turnover rate in the
child welfare workforce is twenty percent for public agencies and forty percent for private agen-
cies); Editorial, A Legal Hand for Foster Children, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 28, 2005, at
B 18 ("[W]ith many of these lawyers burdened with overwhelming student loans, poorly com-
pensated posts and outrageous caseloads, many are being forced out of these roles that foster
children so desperately need."). Child abuse investigations are not completed in a timely fash-
ion, social workers and attorneys do not visit children in their placements, and court hearings
do not take place in accordance with federal guidelines. See Ben Kerman, What Is the Child and
Family Service Review? (2003) at http:/www.caseyfamilyservices.org/pdfs/casey- whatis.pdf.
On numerous occasions, child welfare agencies have lost track of children in their custody or
have failed to monitor a child's placement resulting in serious harm to the child. See, e.g.,
Associated Press, Michigan Agency Loses 302 Children, Aug. 30, 2002 (noting that Michigan
could not locate 302 abused and neglected children.). Not surprisingly, children in foster care
experience a wide range of problems, including mental health issues, poor academic perform-
ance, and involvement with the juvenile delinquency system. See M.E. Cox, J.G. Orme & K.W.
Rhodes, Willingness to Foster Special Needs Children and Foster Family Utilization, 23
CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 298-317 (2002) (estimating that thirty percent to eighty per-
cent of children in foster care exhibit emotional or behavioral problems); Children's Defense
Fund, Improving Education for Children in Foster Care with Disabilities, at www.childrensde-
fense.org/site/PageServer?pagename=childwelfare-adoption-improving-education (observing
that children in foster care are twice as likely to drop out of school, and almost forty percent of
children who age out of care will never receive a high school diploma); Westat, Inc., A National
Evaluation of Title IV-E Foster Care Independent Living Programs for Youth, Phase 2: Final
Report (1991) (describing that many foster children end up in jail or on public assistance, or oth-
erwise represent an economic cost to society after exiting the foster care system).
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need of out-of-state placements is forty-three months, two full years
longer than the average waiting time for a child with a potential placement
in state.9 This disparity exists due to the application of the ICPC, which
imposes significant obstacles for foster children like Tasha who have
potential placements in another state. Under the ICPC, a state cannot send
a foster child to another state without obtaining approval from the receiv-
ing state agency, which must determine whether the placement is contrary
to the child's interests.'° If the agency denies approval, the Compact pro-
hibits a family court from making the placement.
This process has created enormous delays and confusion surrounding
the interstate placement of foster children." One court described the
statute as a "well-intentioned" law "designed to help children, but whose
net effect harms children by making it difficult ... to issue orders which
are in the... child's best interest."' 2 Yet, despite the serious consequences
for children awaiting interstate placements, very few scholars have
addressed the impact of the ICPC on foster children. 3 A comprehensive
9. See Representative Tom Delay, Remarks Regarding the ICPC (Mar. 29, 2004) (on file
with author).
10. The Compact contains ten articles that define the types of placements and placers sub-
ject to the law, the procedures to be followed in making an interstate placement and the specific
protections, services, and requirements established by the law. AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN
SERVICES ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 2
(2002) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE ICPC]. The provisions of the Compact are available at
http://icpc.aphsa.org/documents/Guidebook-2002.pdf. Article Ill of the Compact prohibits a
court from sending a child to another state "until the appropriate public authorities in the receiv-
ing state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement
does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child." Guide to the ICPC at 10. See also
In re T.M.J., 2005 D.C. App. LEXIS 381 at *9 ("As the ICPC dictates, Maryland's refusal to
approve placement of the child with J.A. [a relative] barred the [District of Columbia] Superior
Court from ordering that disposition.").
11. The impediments to permanency created by the ICPC have generated the criticism of a
number of organizations, including the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,
the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, and the Steering Committee on the Unmet
Legal Needs of Children of the American Bar Association, which have all passed resolutions
recognizing the need to expedite the process. See Representative Tom Delay, Remarks
Regarding the ICPC, (Mar. 29, 2004) available at http://tomdelay.house.gov/News/
DocumentPrint.aspxDocumentID=29120; see also Madelyn Freundlich, Reforming the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children: A New Framework for Interstate Adoption,
4 HYBRID 15, 30-31 (1997) (recognizing that outcomes for children under the ICPC "have been
at best troubling and at worst, dire").
12. In re Lisa B., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1735 at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
13. Only four articles have been written analyzing the ICPC. Freundlich, supra note 11, at
15; Libow, supra note 2, at 19; Bernadette W. Hartsfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. REV. 292 (1989); Kimberly
Butler, Child Welfare-Outside the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children-
Placement of a Child with a Natural Parent, 37 VILL. L. REV. 896 (1992). Of these, two have
specifically addressed the impact of the ICPC on interstate adoptions, Freundlich at 15;
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analysis of the Compact, its provisions and its negative consequences is
long overdue.
Recent events provide the impetus for conducting such an examination.
For the first time in over forty years, serious attention is being given to
reforming the statute. In the Summer of 2003, the American Public
Human Services Association (APHSA), 4 a nonprofit organization that
represents a variety of state interests in the field of health and human serv-
ices, formed an ICPC task force to examine the statute and to identify
steps to improve the process of placing children across state lines. 5 In
March 2004, leadership in the APHSA directed that a national group be
convened to rewrite the Compact.' 6 Recently, the group released a final
draft of its proposal for consideration by state legislatures. These efforts
compliment the recent passage of federal legislation to address delays in
completing interstate home studies under the ICPC.17
Unfortunately, neither of these initiatives offers the comprehensive
change necessary to expedite the placement of foster children in a manner
consistent with their permanency needs. This article critically examines
the current efforts to reform the ICPC and proposes substantive changes
to improve the interstate placement process of foster children. First, the
article presents a brief overview of the Compact, including an analysis of
the major problems that the uniform law currently poses to the interstate
placement of foster children. Second is an analysis of current reform
efforts on both the state and federal levels. Third, the article argues that
Hartsfield at 292, and one reviewed a specific case, Butler at 896. None have specifically
focused on the barriers imposed by the ICPC on interstate placements of foster children.
14. The American Public Human Services Association (APHSA), founded in 1930 as the
American Public Welfare Association, is a bipartisan membership organization that represents
all fifty state public human service agencies across the country and 200 local public agencies
including New York City and Los Angeles. Its mission is to develop, promote, and implement
public human services policies and practices that improve the health and well-being of families.
The APHSA has eleven program affiliates who provide expert advice and consultation. The two
affiliates relevant to the rewrite of the ICPC are the National Association of Public Child
Welfare Administrators (NAPCWA) and the Association of Administrators of the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children (AAICPC). NAPCWA represents the "voice of child
welfare" in national discussions and has two primary functions: (1) advancing the field of child
welfare; and (2) improving child welfare organizational effectiveness. AAICPC works to
improve practice and administration of the current Compact by providing training and techni-
cal assistance. APHSA & The Rewrite of ICPC (APHA 2006) at http://www.aphsa.org/
Policy/Doc/APHSA%20&%20the%20Rewrite.pdf. More information about the APHSA and its
affiliates can be found at www.aphsa.org.
15. See APSHA & The Rewrite of ICPC (APHSA 2006) at http://www.aphsa.org/Policy/
Doc/APHSA%20&%20the%20Rewrite.pdf
16. Id.
17. The Safe and Timely Interstate Placement of Foster Children Act of 2006 was signed
into law on July 3, 2006. See H.R. 5403, S. 2999, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted).
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these efforts do not address the permanency needs of foster children
because they fail to alter the status quo in any significant way, preserving
the elements of the current system-untimely home studies, poor deci-
sion-making and inadequate review procedures-that are harming chil-
dren. Finally, this article will propose substantive changes to the structure
of making interstate placement decisions that will honor the best interests
of children. Specifically, the changes will mandate that home studies be
completed in a time period consistent with the child's needs and will
empower courts to be the final arbiter of placement decisions.
II. Overview of the Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children
A. The Impact of the ICPC on Placement Decisions
Involving Foster Children
Courts in child abuse and neglect cases possess the authority to deter-
mine a foster child's placement and make these decisions pursuant to
applicable legal standards. Guided by constitutional doctrine, federal and
state laws, and policy concerns, courts utilize a hierarchy in determining
where a foster child should live. For example, a biological parent's rela-
tionship with her child is entitled to constitutional protection and a court
may not separate a child from her parent without a finding of parental
unfitness. 18 If the child must be removed from the parent's custody,
federal and state laws express a preference for placing children with
relatives.' 9 Only in situations in which the parents are unfit and relatives
18. The liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court. Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). The Court's decisions "establish that the Constitution pro-
tects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1989). The
autonomy of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth
Amendment. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (due process clause), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (Equal
Protection Clause) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Ninth
Amendment)). The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that the natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. The fact that some parents at
times may act against the interests of the child has not convinced the Court to discard the pre-
sumption in favor of parents. "The statist notion that governmental power should supersede
parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to
American tradition." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (2006) ("[T]he State shall consider giving preference to an
adult relative over a nonrelated caregiver when determining a placement for a child, provided
that the relative caregiver meets all relevant State child protection standards"); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.954a (2006) ("Upon removal ... the supervising agency shall, within 30 days, identify,
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are unavailable are unrelated foster parents considered for placement. An
unrelated foster parent has no cognizable legal right to the child.2"
After ascertaining the applicable legal standard, which may vary
depending on who is seeking to become the child's caregiver, courts make
placement decisions after considering evidence such as reports by social
workers and hearing arguments made by all parties to the case, including
the child. Although the time in which intrastate placement decisions are
made vary by state law and local practice, parties in the proceeding have the
ability to file emergency motions to request a court hearing if immediate
placement is necessary. Aggrieved parties can utilize expedited appellate
procedures to seek review of a trial court's decision.2' An underlying theme
in the decision-making process is the child's need for decisions to be made
expeditiously and for a permanent placement to be identified and finalized
as quickly as possible. Child welfare agencies' receipt of federal foster
care funding is conditioned, in part, on promptly developing a permanency
plan for each foster child, which is an exit strategy to ensure that the state
will not permanently assume a parental role over a child. 2
locate, and consult with relatives to determine placement with a fit and appropriate relative who
would meet the child's developmental, emotional, and physical needs as an alternative to foster
care"). See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (recognizing that familial
relations between children and their extended family are protected by substantive due process);
Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1017 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[Tjhe constitutional concept of family has
evolved, however, to include relationships among members of what has commonly become known
as extended family"); Osborne v. County of Riverside, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
("It is this court's view ... that the parental liberty interest in familial integrity and association
extends to close relatives in long-standing custodial relationships with related children").
20. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 846-47
(1977) ("While the Court has recognized that liberty interests may in some cases arise from pos-
itive-law sources.., in such a case, and particularly where, as here, the claimed interest derives
from a knowingly assumed contractual relation with the State, it is appropriate to ascertain from
state law the expectations and entitlements of the parties. In this case, the limited recognition
accorded to the foster family by the New York statutes and the contracts executed by the foster
parents argue against any but the most limited constitutional 'liberty' in the foster family");
Tallman v. Milton, 482 N.W.2d 187 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (denying standing to foster parents
seeking custody of children in their care). But see D.C. CODE § 16-2304(b)(4)(B) (2006) (grant-
ing party status to foster parents caring for children for more than a year); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 712A. 19b(1) (2006) (permitting foster parents to file petitions to terminate a parent's rights in
certain situations).
21. See, e.g., Mich. Ct. R. 7.213(C)(2) (2006) (giving priority appellate consideration to
child custody cases); D.C. CODE § 16-2328 (2006) (permitting interlocutory appeal of initial
placement order).
22. Foster care reimbursement to states under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act constitutes
the largest federal expenditure to address child abuse and neglect issues. The funding covers
state efforts to maintain the placement of children in foster care, train child welfare workers and
foster parents, and administer the foster care system. To receive the funding, states must comply
with a series of directives from the federal government, which include developing permanency
plans for foster children and making reasonable efforts to effectuate those plans. The federal
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When the potential caregiver, whether a parent, relative, or foster par-
ent, resides out-of-state, the decision-making process is complicated due
to the ICPC.23 The ICPC governs the interstate placement of foster chil-
dren and requires the cooperation of child welfare agencies in both the
states sending and receiving the child prior to an interstate placement.24
The Compact requires sending agencies to notify appropriate agencies in
the state receiving the child prior to placing the child in that state.25
Agencies in the receiving state are then given the opportunity to investi-
gate the proposed placement and, if satisfied, must notify the sending state
that the placement does not appear to be contrary to the child's interests.26
The law does not list any factors that agencies must consider when deter-
mining whether a placement furthers a "child's interests." In practice,
when making this decision, states typically consider a multitude of factors
including the caretakers' income, preferred form of discipline, safety of
the neighborhood, proposed sleeping arrangements of the children, house-
keeping standards, and the school performance of the other children in the
government monitors compliance with these mandates through periodic audits. For a more
detailed discussion on federal funding of the child welfare system, see Miriam Rollin et al.,
Federal Child Welfare Law and Policy: Understanding the Federal Law and Funding Process,
in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE 143-83 (2005).
23. Interstate compacts provide a means through which states can resolve conflicts such as
boundary disputes. McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991). Though Article
I, Section 10 of the Constitution requires congressional approval prior to the formation of an
interstate compact, the Supreme Court has interpreted the provision to require congressional
approval only when a compact is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to
increase the political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States." Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
Congressional consent of the ICPC, which has not been given, is not required because the
Compact focuses wholly on adoption and foster care of children, areas of jurisdiction tradition-
ally retained by the States. McComb, 934 F.2d at 479.
24. GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 1.
25. Id. at 4-5. To initiate an ICPC request, a local caseworker in the sending agency sub-
mits a written ICPC request, known as an ICPC IOOA, along with other information such as the
child's social history and case plan, medical and financial information, and any court orders, to
the sending agency's ICPC office. That office transmits the materials to the receiving state's
ICPC office that forwards the packet to a local public or private child welfare agency responsi-
ble for conducting a home study of the proposed placement. The home study is completed in
accordance with the requirements of that state and upon its completion, the local worker in the
receiving state prepares a written report that includes a recommendation approving or denying
the placement and transmits the report to the sending state ICPC office. Based upon this rec-
ommendation, the receiving state's ICPC office makes the final determination of whether to
approve or deny the placement. If the placement is approved, the sending state can decide
whether it still wishes to place the child; if denied, the placement cannot be made unless the
problems causing the denial are remedied. AMER. PUB. HUM. SERvs. Ass'N, UNDERSTANDING
DELAYS IN THE INTERSTATE HOME STUDY PROCESS 8 (2002) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
DELAYS].
26. See ICPC Article 111(d), reprinted in GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 10.
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home, though none of these factors are legally required.27 If the receiving
state disapproves of the proposed placement, then the Compact prohibits
the placement from being made and courts have no authority to review
that decision.2 8
If the placement is approved, the court may send the child to the receiv-
ing state, but the sending state retains the financial responsibility for sup-
port and maintenance of the child during the time of the placement.2 9 The
sending agency may enter into a financial agreement with a public or pri-
vate agency in the receiving state to supervise the child's out-of-state
placement. This contracted agency can provide reports and assessments to
the sending state court, which still retains jurisdiction to make decisions
in the case.
3 °
The need for this statutory framework arose out of problems created by
interstate placements of foster children, primarily involving assessing pro-
posed placements, monitoring foster children in such placements and pro-
viding services to the children.3' In the 1950s, a group of social service
administrators studied the problems of children moving out-of-state for
foster care or preadoptive placements.32 Three difficulties were identified
by the group: (1) the failure of statutes enacted by individual states to pro-
vide protection for children moved interstate; (2) the inability of state
courts and agencies sending children to another state to ensure proper care
and supervision in the receiving state; and (3) the absence of means to
compel the receiving state to provide services in support of the foster
child's placement.33 The Council of State Governments,34 a nonprofit
organization whose responsibilities include helping states address inter-
state issues, noted:
27. These standards are listed in ICPC Model Form 102, which is available at http:Ilwww.
dhr.state.md.us/ssa/icpc/pdf/102.pdf.
28. ICPC Article 111(d) reprinted in GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 20. See also
Draftsmen's Notes on Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, reprinted in ROBERTA
HUNT, OBSTACLES TO INTERSTATE ADOPTION 45 (1972) [hereinafter Draftsmen's Notes] ("If the
public authorities find positive reason to believe that the placement would be contrary to the
interests of the child, they are empowered to prevent the placement by withholding their writ-
ten notification"); Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Secretariat Opinion No. 43
(Mar. 12, 1981) ("Even if the state court disagrees with the determination of the receiving state
Compact Administrator with respect to the making of a placement in the receiving state, the
court does not have the jurisdiction or the power to act contrary to it").
29. ICPC Article V(a), reprinted in GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 11. Article V(c),
however, clarifies that the receiving state may discharge the sending state of financial responsi-
bility for the support and maintenance of the child. Id.
30. ICPC Article V(a)(b), reprinted in GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 11.
31. GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 1.
32. Id.
33. Hartsfield, supra note 13, at 295.
34. More information about the Council of State Governments can be found at http://www.
csg.org/about/default.aspx.
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Supervision of the out-of-state source from which a child may be sent into the
jurisdiction is difficult or impossible. When the state having a placement law is
the originating point for the child, no legally binding control may be exercised
once the placement has been made, unless a really bad situation develops in the
other state, is discovered by its welfare authorities and is treated as a new case
needing corrective action on a wholly local basis.
35
To address these limitations, proposed language was drafted for an
interstate compact on the placement of children for each state to enact to
enable participating states to extend their ability to make appropriate deci-
sions for foster children beyond their borders.36 As its drafters noted,
"[T]he Compact provides procedures for the interstate placement of chil-
dren (either by public agencies or by private persons or agencies) when
such placement is for foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adop-
tion. ' '37 The final draft of the Compact was approved by a twelve-state
conference held in January 1960, and two months later, New York became
the first state to ratify the ICPC.38 By 1990, every state, the District of
Columbia and the Virgin Islands had passed legislation enacting identical
versions of the Compact into law.
3 9
B. Impediments to Permanency Created by the ICPC
The ICPC creates a mechanism for child welfare agencies in different
states to share information about the suitability of proposed placements
and to continue monitoring children in those placements. While undoubt-
edly the Compact has enabled child welfare agencies and courts to access
more information about potential interstate placements, it has created a
system in which foster children awaiting interstate placements languish in
temporary placements indefinitely. This occurs for three reasons. First, the
child waits at a temporary placement while the bureaucracy responsible
for administering the ICPC makes its decision. Second, the decision-mak-
ing process is prone to errors because social workers, utilizing a vague and
undefined legal standard, are empowered to make decisions without any
judicial oversight. Finally, if an error is made, adequate administrative
review procedures are unavailable. Under the ICPC, a child's opportunity
to achieve permanency rests on the action or inaction of a single case-
worker, who, in all likelihood, has very little connection to the child.
35. Hartsfield, supra note 13, at 296.
36. Id. at 295.
37. McComb, 934 F.2d at 480 (quoting Council of State Governments, Suggested State
Legislative Program for 1961 49 (1960)).
38. Draftsmen's Notes, supra note 28, at 49.
39. GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 1.
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As noted above, to facilitate the interstate placement of a foster child,
the state in which the proposed placement is located must conduct a home
study and render a decision as to whether the proposed placement is con-
trary to the child's interests. Long delays in completing interstate home
studies constitute a major problem with this process. 40 The Compact does
not contain a timeframe by which a home study and a placement decision
must be completed by the receiving state. Reports suggest that home stud-
ies often take up to a year if not longer to complete.41
A number of factors contribute to the delay.42 More than half of states
responding to a 2002 study commissioned by the APHSA cited resolving
financial and medical issues as a leading cause of delay. 43 Nearly half of
states also identified criminal background checks and missing information
as other contributing factors.' Finally, an overwhelming majority of states
ranked bureaucratic issues, such as inadequate staff, lack of training, and
high caseworker turnover rates, as significant contributors to the delay.45
While this slow process takes place, children remain in temporary
placements, typically in the form of a licensed foster home or an institu-
tional setting such as a group home. Children wait in these placements for
months. They may form emotional attachments with foster parents, group
home staff, and other children in the facility, which may subsequently
complicate placement decisions and inflict additional trauma on the chil-
dren if they are removed from the temporary setting.46 As one court
observed, "[T]he typical delay is so long that the requirement to use this
40. Bruce Boyer, in a report to the American Bar Association, writes, "As a result of all of
the problems associated with the Compact, what should take days or weeks to accomplish often
takes months or, at times, over a year while children wait in temporary out-of-home placements
for the adults in charge of their futures to fulfill their professional obligations." See Bruce
Boyer, Report to the American Bar Association (Mar. 2003) available at http://www.
abanet.org/leadership/2003/journal/ 118.pdf. State Compact administrators report waiting an
average of three to four months for the entire home study to be completed. Office of Inspector
General, Department of Health and Human Services, Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children: Implementation 6 (1999). See also, A.A. v. Cleburne, 2005 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS at
*238 (Ala. Ct. App. 2005) (reporting social worker's belief that ICPC home study would take
a minimum of nine months to complete).
41. See Libow, supra note 2, at 22 (observing that the ICPC approval process frequently
takes between six months and a year and at times has exceeded one year).
42. See UNDERSTANDING DELAYS, supra note 25, at 15, for a comprehensive analysis of




46. See In re L.H., P.H., 676 N.W.2d 212, 213 (Mich. 2004) (observing that "children are
people, not property or pawns to be moved around and torn from those they know as their par-
ents."); In re L.L., 653 A.2d 873, 883-84 (D.C. 1995) (acknowledging that "[e]ach time she [a
child] is moved, she gets a scar and who knows whether if ever it will be healed."); Michael
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process often eliminates viable alternatives from the court's consideration
and thus harms the child rather than helps the child."47
Yet, no mechanism exists to force a state to complete a home study in
a timely manner. Article IV of the Compact states that a violation "shall
constitute a violation of the laws respecting the placement of children of
both the state in which the sending agency is located or from which it
sends or brings the child and of the receiving state. '48 No specific penal-
ties, however, are set forth in the statute or in state laws. If a state refuses
to complete a home study within a reasonable amount of time, what meas-
ures can the sending state, the proposed caregiver or the child take to
expedite the process? Are financial penalties an option to coerce compli-
ance? Who has standing to litigate these issues? No answers are provided
in the statute and no court has imposed a penalty on a state for failing to
comply with its terms. State agencies have no incentive to complete place-
ment decisions in a timely manner and foster children must wait
indefinitely until the bureaucracy responds.
The problems created by the lengthy delays are exacerbated by the high
level of subjectivity in the decision-making process. Under the ICPC, the
child welfare agency in the receiving state possesses the sole authority to
decide whether the interstate placement should be made. The statute, how-
ever, offers very little guidance for workers making this decision.49 The
only standard set forth in the Compact is that the receiving state shall
determine if the placement "does not appear contrary to the interests" of
the child. ° Nowhere in the statute are the child's interests defined.
Consequently, the standards used by agencies governing placement
decisions vary from state to state, are unwritten, and often depend on the
personal biases of individual caseworkers.5' Evidence of a prior arrest or
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards,
27 STANFORD L. REV. 985, 995 (1975) ("[N]o child can grow emotionally while in limbo. He
cannot invest except in a minimal way.., if tomorrow the relationship may be severed").
47. In re Lisa B., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1735 at *5-6.
48. ICPC Article IV, reprinted in GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 10.
49. See Freundlich, supra note 11, at 30-31 ("[T]he Compact mandates very little concern-
ing the approval process that the receiving state must utilize.... The ICPC ... in its substan-
tive provisions, fails to set even minimal standards for the assessment of suitability, appropri-
ateness, and desirability of care").
50. Article 111(d), reprinted in Guide to the ICPC, supra note 10, at 10.
51. Racial, cultural, and sexist prejudices often inject themselves in these determinations.
See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS 55-59 (2002). ("Vague definitions of neglect, unbri-
dled discretion, and lack of training form a dangerous combination in the hands of caseworkers
charged with deciding the fate of families .... Unlike child abuse that can at least be substantiated
with physical evidence, the vague definition of neglect is highly susceptible to biased evalua-
tions of harm based on the parents' race or class or on cultural differences in child rearing").
Racially based decision-making may explain why a disproportionate number of children of color
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an old criminal conviction may be enough to fail the State's assessment.
A house may be "dirty" or "too small" or a caretaker may lack the
"expertise" to care for his child.53 If the prospective caretakers cannot
prove to a caseworker at the receiving state agency that the proposed
placement is not contrary to the child's interest, then the agency will dis-
approve the placement. The caseworker's assessment is the sole determi-
nant of whether a child can be placed in the new home.
The caseworker possesses this unlimited discretion regardless of
whether the potential placement is with a parent, relative, or foster parent.
Although the explicit language in the statute limits the Compact's scope
to placements of children in foster care and preadoptive homes, most
courts and child welfare agencies apply the ICPC to all situations in which
a child may cross state lines, including placements of children with their
biological parents and relatives.54 The Compact, however, fails to differ-
enter foster care. See Michigan Advisory Committee on the Overrepresentation of Children of
Color in Foster Care, Equity: Moving Towards Better Outcomes for All of Michigan's Children
5 (2006) available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/DHS-Child-Equity-Report-
153952_7.pdf (observing that "[a]lthough African-American children represent slightly less
than 18 percent of all children in the state, more than half of the children in out-of-home care
are African-American, or one out of every 50 African-American children in the state"). For
example, many more white women than women of color, including pregnant women and par-
ents, use illicit drugs. However, studies show that African-American children prenatally
exposed to illicit drugs are much more likely than white children to be reported to protective
services and are more likely to be placed in foster care, even after taking into account factors
such as the family's previous child welfare involvement, the physical health of the child and
other related factors. Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the
Challenges of Contemporary Foster Care, 14 FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 80 (2004). See ROBERTS, at
47-55 for a summary of studies indicating racial bias in child welfare decision-making.
52. See, e.g., In re Emmanuel R., 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 3109 at *4-5 (placement request
denied based on "criminal record" and "past history" with child welfare authorities); Dep't of
Services for Children v. J.W., 2004 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS at *142 (Fam. Ct. Del. 2004) (denial
primarily based on the fact that the father had more than two misdemeanor convictions).
53. See, e.g., Adoption of Leland, 2006 Mass. App. LEXIS 200 at *7 (Mass. Ct. App. 2006)
(home study of father denied because too many people lived in the home); State of New Jersey
v. K.F., 803 A.2d 721 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002) (denial based in part on the fact that prior home
was "cramped, cluttered and dirty," even though the current residence met all of the relevant
state standards); Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998) (placement
request denied because of father's poor living conditions, extensive criminal history, and his
"inability fully to understand and to address his son's significant emotional and behavioral prob-
lems"). In a case in which I was involved, the State of Alabama denied an ICPC placement
request due to the fact that a mother failed to disclose she was married to an individual who had
a twenty-year-old conviction. No other reason was stated for the denial.
54. See Arizona Dep't of Economic Security v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513, 514 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1999) (finding that the ICPC applied to biological parents, the "view held by the majority of
jurisdictions that have addressed this question"); Dep't of Children and Families v. Benway,
745 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("The majority of courts considering the appli-
cability of the ICPC to out-of-state placements with natural parents have concluded that the
ICPC does apply"). See also Green v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 864 A.2d 921 (Del. 2004) (applying
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entiate between parents and other caregivers and does not incorporate the
constitutional presumption that children remain placed with their parents
absent a finding of parental unfitness. A parent must undergo the same
scrutiny as an unrelated foster parent, and the caseworker has unlimited
discretion to deny a placement based solely on what she perceives is in the
child's best interest, regardless of whether the parent is fit. A parent, who
may be legally entitled to custody if living in the same state as his child,
may be denied placement of his child under the ICPC based on the sub-
jective decision of a caseworker. The ICPC similarly fails to incorporate
a preference, which is recognized by both statutes and case law, to place
children with relatives.55 Instead, the statute treats all classes of potential
caregivers in an identical manner, regardless of their legal status.
The ICPC also frustrates the resolution of permanency decisions for a
child because remedies to reverse an agency's erroneous placement deci-
sion are unavailable. The Compact provides no process for an aggrieved
individual to seek review of an agency's placement decision. If a place-
ment is denied by the agency, then the potential caretaker is not given the
opportunity to challenge the decision in court. The Compact delegates the
out-of-state placement decision exclusively to the administrative agency
that assessed the home in the receiving state.
56
Administrative review procedures are largely unavailable and inade-
quate where they exist. Most states have not established administrative
Compact to noncustodial fathers); H.P. v. Dep't of Child. and Fam., 838 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003) (holding that Compact applies to placement of children with nonoffending, non-
custodial, out-of-state mother); Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d at 1021 (terminating father's
rights because he lived out-of-state and was deemed to be an inappropriate placement pursuant
to the ICPC); Custody of Quincy, 563 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. Ct. App. 1990) (observing that
Compact should have been followed when child placed with out-of-state parent to ensure that
child would receive appropriate services); State Juvenile Dep't of Clackamas County v. Smith,
811 P.2d 145, 147 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) ("The Compact does apply to a child who is sent to
another state for placement with parents or relatives when someone other than a parent or rela-
tive makes the placement"); Orsborn v. Montana DPHHS, 2004 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3524 at *11
(Dist. Ct. Mont. 2004) (upholding application of ICPC to proposed placement of foster child
with noncustodial biological father). A sampling of state Web sites also demonstrates the per-
vasive practice of applying the ICPC to biological parents. See, e.g., www.dss.mo.gov/cd/icpc.
htm (Missouri); www.cga.ct.gov/ps99/rpt/olr/htm99-r-0327.htm (Connecticut); www.dhs.state.
mn.us/main/groups/children/documents/pub/dhs id 001471 .hcsp (Minnesota); dhfs.wisconsin.
gov/Children/ICPC/prgserv/recgplcmnts.htm (Wisconsin); www.childsworld.ca.gov/lnterstate_
328.htm (California). In addition, model forms created by the APHSA and used by the states
include biological parents within the scope of the statute. See, e.g., ICPC Form 100A reprinted
in GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 26. For a more detailed discussion of the ICPC's appli-
cability to biological, parents, see Vivek S. Sankaran, Out-of-State and Out of Luck: The
Treatment of Non-Custodial Parents Under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2007).
55. See supra note 19.
56. See supra note 10.
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processes to review denials of the ICPCY7 and those that have, place a
high burden on litigants to demonstrate that the administrative agency's
decision was erroneous.58 Utilizing state administrative procedures acts to
challenge denials of ICPC approval also poses problems. First, some
states do not permit administrative challenges to decisions where the sub-
stantive statute does not explicitly grant litigants the right to a hearing,
which the ICPC does not.59 Even if such challenges are permissible, liti-
gants face a nearly insurmountable burden to demonstrate that the
agency's decision was erroneous because the standard set forth in the
ICPC to deny a home study-whether a placement would be contrary to
the interests of the child-is subjective and is based largely on the per-
sonal opinion of the caseworker. Hearing officers will be reluctant to
reverse such decisions since the decision is based on an inherently sub-
jective standard.6" In addition, the unavailability of the tools typically
available to litigants in court proceedings to develop a factual record, such
as discovery and subpoena power, pose additional procedural obstacles
for caretakers attempting to rebut an agency's factual findings at an
administrative hearing. Relaxed evidentiary rules also make it difficult to
keep out unreliable information. 61 The permanent placement of foster
57. As part of this paper, researchers surveyed the ICPC office in every state to inquire
about procedures to review denials of ICPC approval. In 35 states, workers in the offices stated
that no process existed to appeal an ICPC denial. Twelve state offices stated that such a process
existed and in three states, workers did not know the answer to the question.
58. Massachusetts is one of few states that specifically grants an individual aggrieved under
the ICPC a legal right to an administrative hearing. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.523 (2005). The
procedures governing this hearing, however, demonstrate the illusory nature of this right. In the
hearing, the aggrieved party bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that
the "[d]epartment or provider acted without a reasonable basis or in an unreasonable manner
which resulted in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party." Id. at § 10.05. The rules of evi-
dence do not apply, and the hearing officer "shall not recommend reversal of the clinical deci-
sion made by a trained social worker if there is a reasonable basis for the questioned decision."
Id. at §§ 10.21 (1); 10.05. In addition, if an "area director" or a "clinical review team" made the
ICPC decision, the hearing officer lacks the authority to reverse the decision without the
approval of the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services. Id.
59. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.203(3) (2006) (defining "contested case" to mean a
proceeding.., in which a determination of the legal rights, duties or privileges of a named party
is required by law to be made by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing")
(emphasis added).
60. By analogy, appellate courts have deferred to trial courts' best interests determinations.
See, e.g., Francois v. Leon, 834 So. 2d 1109, 1114 (La. 2002) ("In cases involving the custody
of children, the trial court is vested with a vast amount of discretion. The trial court is in a
better position to evaluate the best interests of a child"); In re A.H., 748 N.E. 2d 183, 194 (I11.
2001) ("The trial court is vested with wide discretion in its determination of the best interests
of the minor in temporary custody hearings"); Rutledge v. Harris, 263 A.2d 256, 257 (D.C.
1970) (recognizing limited scope of revisiting a trial court's determination of a child's best
interests).
61. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.275 (2006) ("[A]n agency may admit and give pro-
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children is often in limbo until the potential caregivers navigate a compli-
cated bureaucracy to get the placement decision reviewed, if that possi-
bility exists at all under state law. In reality this rarely occurs, and when
a child welfare agency denies ICPC approval, courts are forced to place a
child's permanency on hold indefinitely until the caregiver decides to move,
the receiving state unilaterally reverses its decision, or another long-term
placement option becomes available.
The impediments the statute has created for foster children seeking per-
manency in their lives helped create momentum to reform the Compact,
which has remained unchanged since its drafting over forty years ago.
A major reform proposal initiated at the state level has been submitted to
legislatures for public consideration. This complements recent federal
legislation enacted to address the timeliness of interstate home studies. A
close analysis of the proposals, however, illustrates their failure to offer
comprehensive solutions to the delays in achieving permanency for foster
children created by the Compact.
III. Current Reform Initiatives
A. State Efforts
State and federal lawmakers have developed different legislative
proposals to address the problems created by the Compact. The most com-
prehensive effort has been undertaken at the state level. In July 2003, the
APHSA formed an ICPC task force to examine the statute and to draft leg-
islation to reform the Compact. 62 Members included state commissioners,
state child welfare directors, ICPC administrators, and a representative from
the American Association of Public Welfare Attorneys.6 3 The task force
met regularly over the three-year period and publicly released its proposed
revisions to the law on March 31, 2006. These revisions will become
effective and binding upon the legislative enactment of the proposal into
law by at least thirty-five states. To date, no state has enacted the new ver-
sion of the Compact.
The new version of the law (the proposed Compact) attempts to address
many of the concerns noted above. 64 First, several provisions in the pro-
bative effect to evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the con-
duct of their affairs.... [A]n agency, for the purpose of expediting hearings and when the inter-
ests of the parties will not be substantially prejudiced thereby, may provide in a contested case
or by rule for submission of all or part of the evidence in written form."); D.C. CODE §
2-509(b) (2006) ("Any oral and documentary evidence may be received").
62. ICPC Task Force Report (APHSA Mar. 2004), www.aphsa.org.
63. Id.
64. The proposed Compact is available at http://www.aphsa.org/home/Doc/lnterstate-
Compact-for-the-Placement-of-Children.pdf.
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posed Compact emphasize the importance of making placement decisions
in a timely manner. Article I articulates that a key purpose of the law is to
ensure that "children are placed in safe and suitable homes in a timely
manner."6 5 Article V states that "the public child placing agency in the
receiving state shall complete or arrange for the completion of the assess-
ment within the timeframes established in rules promulgated by the Interstate
Commission," a new regulatory body established in Article IX of the pro-
posed Compact.66 The duties of the Interstate Commission include, among
other things, promulgating rules, providing for dispute resolution, and
issuing advisory opinions. Article VII reiterates the concern surrounding
delays in the process by stating that a "public child placing agency in the
receiving state shall provide timely assessments" as provided for by the
Interstate Commission.67 The proposed Compact also expedites the place-
ment of children with relatives by permitting "provisional placements" to be
made once the receiving state receives assurances that the proposed place-
ment is safe and suitable, even if the standards or requirements otherwise
applicable to prospective foster or adoptive parents have not been met.68
Second, the proposed Compact attempts to clarify the legal standard
governing the receiving state's decision to approve or deny a proposed
placement. Article II defines an "approved placement" to mean that "the
receiving state has determined after an assessment that the placement is
both safe and suitable for the child and is in compliance with the applica-
ble laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children there-
in."'69 The Article further explains that an "assessment" is "an evaluation
of a prospective placement to determine whether the placement meets the
individualized needs of the child, including but not limited to the child's
safety and stability, health and well-being, and mental, emotional and
physical development."7 Finally, the proposed Compact permits the
Interstate Commission to develop uniform standards to assess the safety
and suitability of interstate placements.7 ' These proposals reflect the ICPC
task force's intent to define the standard that currently governs the
approval process.
Third, the proposed Compact offers increased protection for familial
relationships, primarily between biological parents and their children.
Placements made by parents or relatives with legal authority over the
65. Proposed Compact, Article I(A).
66. Id. at Article V(F).
67. Id. at Article VII(D).
68. Id. at Article 1I(L).
69. Proposed Compact, Article II(A)
70. Id. at Article I(B)
71. Id. at Article V(G)
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child with other relatives and placements made by parents with nonrela-
tives without the intention of effectuating an adoption are explicitly out-
side the scope of the law as are visits between children and out-of-state
individuals.72 Placements of foster children with noncustodial parents are
exempted from the statutory requirements if (a) the parent proves to the
court in the sending state that he has a "substantial relationship" with the
child; (b) the court makes a finding that the placement is in the child's best
interest; and (c) the court in the sending state dismisses its jurisdiction
over the case.
7 3
Fourth, the proposed Compact attempts to create mechanisms to enforce
these new measures through the Interstate Commission. If the Commission
determines that a member state has violated the law, it has the power to
(a) provide remedial training and technical assistance; (b) provide written
notice to the defaulting state and means by which the default can be cured;
(c) by majority vote of members, initiate legal action against a defaulting
member in federal court; and (d) avail itself of any other remedies available
under state law.74 The proposed Compact also requires the Commission to
promulgate rules providing for mediation and binding dispute resolution
for disputes among compacting states.
75
Finally, the proposed Compact addresses the rights of individuals
aggrieved by decisions made pursuant to the ICPC. The legislation explic-
itly provides any interested party or person with standing to seek admin-
istrative review of the receiving state's determination.76 The review shall
be conducted in the receiving state pursuant to its applicable administrative
procedures.77 The proposed Compact also ratifies the current interpretation
that the Compact prohibits courts in the sending state from reviewing deci-
sions made by the receiving state agency to deny a proposed placement.
78
B. Federal Reforms
Recent federal legislation, the Safe and Timely Interstate Placement of
Foster Children Act of 2006, signed into law on July 3, 2006, focuses on
the timeliness, or lack thereof, of the completion of ICPC home studies.
The law conditions states' receipt of federal foster-care funds under Title
IV-E of the Social Security Act on completing interstate home studies
72. Id. at Article III(B)(1); Article III(B)(7).
73. Id. at Article III(B)(4).
74. Id. at Article XII(C).
75. Proposed Compact, Article XII(B)(2).
76. Id. at Article VI( C).
77. Id.
78. Proposed Compact, Article VI(B).
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within sixty days.7 9 In addition, for each home study a state completes
within thirty days after receipt of the request, it will receive an incentive
payment of $1,500.80 To fulfill these mandates, the legislation permits
states to utilize private agencies.8 ' Timeliness of home studies is the only
aspect of the ICPC addressed by the federal legislation.
IV. Shortcomings of Current Proposals
While federal and state governments deserve credit for recognizing the
need to reform the ICPC, current efforts fall short of the massive overhaul
needed to ensure that decisions furthering the best interests of children are
made. Instead, these reforms present modest solutions that fail to address
the core concerns with the ICPC-lengthy delays in completing interstate
home studies, poor decision-making, and inadequate review procedures.
Federal legislation is limited in its scope since it only addresses the
timeliness of interstate home studies. The federal effort may expedite the
completion of home studies through financial incentives and penalties, but
the benchmark in the legislation for how quickly home studies must be
completed-sixty days-is too long and does not take into account a
child's sense of time. A child's sense of time focuses exclusively on the
present and precludes meaningful understanding of "temporary" versus
"permanent" or anticipation of the future.82 For young children, periods of
weeks or months are not comprehensible. Disruptions as short as a day
may be stressful.83 The younger the child and the more extended the peri-
od of uncertainty or separation, the more detrimental it will be to the
child's well-being.84 Any intervention that separates a child from a poten-
tial permanent caregiver who could provide the child with psychological
support should be treated as a matter of urgency and profound importance.
Two months, while significantly shorter than the current time it takes to
complete home studies, is still too long a period for children to wait.85
Though appearing to be comprehensive, little substance lies beneath
the language in the proposed Compact developed by the states. For example,
although numerous provisions require assessments to be done in a "timely"
79. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(26)(A)(1) (2006).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 673(g)(3) (2006).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(26)(A)(3)(a).
82. American Academy of Pediatrics: Committee on Early Childhood, Adoption and




85. It is unclear as to whether states will complete interstate home studies within thirty days
to receive the $1,500 bonus offered in the statute. This will depend largely on whether the costs
of expediting the study will be covered by the bonus payment.
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manner, the statute does not define "timely" and it fails to set forth specific
time limits for the completion of interstate home studies. Under the pro-
posal, nothing would prevent a state from taking years to complete a home
study. Instead, the proposed Compact simply acknowledges that time limits
should be determined at a later date and delegates that decision to the
Interstate Compact Commission, which is comprised of the very states
that have failed for years to complete timely home studies.
Similarly, the "provisional placement" language in Article II lacks
sufficient detail to create any meaningful change in the system. The lan-
guage gives states the option to provisionally place children with relatives
when the receiving state determines that the home is "safe and suitable"
but does not give the child or relative an enforceable right for expedited
consideration. The statute does not specify what factors a state must use to
determine if a relative's home is "safe and suitable," how quickly provi-
sional placement home studies must be conducted, and whether a state must
conduct all relative home studies in an expedited manner. None of these
provisions create an obligation for state agencies to ensure that the interstate
placement of foster children with family is conducted in a timely manner.
The proposed Compact fails to remedy the high level of subjectivity
pervasive in current ICPC decision-making. The new standard requires
states, when conducting home assessments, to consider the "individual-
ized needs of the child, including but not limited to the child's safety and
stability, health and well-being, and mental, emotional and physical
development.- 86 These vague terms are left undefined in the statute.
Consequently, what one worker considers a safe and stable home, another
may find objectionable. A dated criminal conviction may cause one
worker, but not another, to question the mental health of a proposed care-
taker. A worker may be able to deny a placement based exclusively on an
instinct that a caretaker cannot care for a child without factual support for
her position. Under this new standard, placement decisions will continue
to hinge on the personal opinions and biases of individual caseworkers.
The new standard provides no additional guidance for caseworkers than the
current "contrary to the interest" standard. It merely adds more undefined,
conclusory terms to an already vague and subjective statutory scheme.
The proposed Compact also continues to treat most biological parents
as legal strangers to the child. Although more limited than its current
form, the proposal will continue to encompass most placements of chil-
dren with their parents. Placement of children with noncustodial parents
are only exempted from the purview of the statute if (1) the parent has a
86. Proposed Compact, Article If(B).
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"substantial relationship" with the child, (2) the placement is in the child's
best interest, and (3) the court determines that the dependency case should
be dismissed immediately after the placement is made. 87 This three-part
test will rarely be met in dependency proceedings. Courts often require
that the dependency case remain open after placing a child with the non-
custodial parent to monitor the placement, ensure that the child receives
appropriate services, and protect the child and the noncustodial parent
from the abusive parent through appropriate court orders.88 In addition,
the statute does not define "substantial relationship" or the "best interests
of the child" and leaves it up to the sending state court, without any guid-
ance, to determine when these factors have been met. The proposed
Compact also continues to encompass placements of children with their
custodial parents. In reality, the proposed Compact will continue to be
applied to most placements of foster children with their parents.
When parents fall within the ambit of the statute, the proposed
Compact continues to treat them as legal strangers to the child and fails to
recognize the protection the Constitution affords their relationship with
their children.89 The process to review a potential placement with a parent
is identical to the scrutiny received by any other potential caregiver.
Nowhere does the statute incorporate the constitutionally required pre-
sumption that children be placed in the custody of their biological parents
absent evidence of parental fitness.90 Out-of-state parents are not guaranteed
an expedited placement decision. The proposed Compact completely over-
looks the protected legal status held by parents with respect to the custody
of their children.
87. Id. at Article III(B)(4).
88. Take for example a situation in which a child is living with his father. His mother lives
out-of-state. Child Protective Services removes the child from his father's home after the child
is severely beaten. The social worker, the lawyer-guardian ad litem, and the judge want to place
the child with his mother, who no one is alleging is unfit, but the court wishes to keep the case
open to provide the family with services, including counseling for the child and parenting classes
to teach the mother how to address issues of physical abuse with her son. In addition, the court
wants the case to remain open to preserve the temporary custody order and to protect the mother
and child through a stay away order against the father. If the case is closed, the temporary cus-
tody order would dissipate and the father could go pick up the child. Under the proposed
Compact, the ICPC would apply in this situation and the child would be separated from his
mother until interstate approval was received.
89. See supra note 18 (listing cases defining constitutional protections afforded to parents
with respect to raising their children).
90. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) ("[S]o long as a parent adequately
cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject
itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make
the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's child"). See also Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999) ("As a general rule ...before parents may be
deprived of the care, custody or management of their children without their consent, due
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Newly proposed enforcement mechanisms for ICPC violations are
insufficient. Take, for example, a situation in which a member state refuses
to complete a home study within a specific time period. The proposed
Compact vests the exclusive authority to determine whether corrective
measures, including litigation, need to be taken with the Interstate
Commission, which is comprised of the states that have violated the
Compact.9 Only if a majority of member states determines that legal
action should be initiated can the Commission file suit in federal court.92
Many reasons having nothing to do with the particular ICPC violation
may influence a member state's vote to pursue legal remedies against
another state for a violation. A state may want to preserve its relationship
with the violating state so that its business on other matters is not affected.
A state may be concerned that the violating state may deny future inter-
state placements in response to the legal action, a real concern due to the
subjectivity of the placement standard and the lack of adequate review
procedures.93 The possibility of collusion constitutes another concern with
vesting the enforcement decision solely in the member states. States, which
traditionally have taken months to complete ICPC home studies, may be
worried about suing another state when it, itself, has not abided by the
statute in other cases. The proposed Compact provides no right for indi-
viduals to compel a State to fulfill the statutory requirements in the ICPC.
Finally, the proposed Compact fails to create a process to review place-
ment decisions made by agency caseworkers. It only provides individuals
with rights they already have-the right to seek review of placement deci-
process--ordinarily a court proceeding resulting in an order permitting removal-must be
accorded to them."); Mabe v. San Bernardino County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1107
(9th Cir. 2001) ("Parents will not be separated from their children without due process of law
except in emergencies.").
91. Proposed Compact, Article XII(C).
92. Id. at Article XII(C)(l)(c).
93. In 2002, the state of Maryland threatened to return more than a thousand foster children
to the District of Columbia due to violations of the ICPC by the D.C. Child and Family Services
Agency. Many of these children were living with relatives in Maryland. In July 2002, the two
states reached a temporary agreement that preserved the placements of those children and
allowed the placement of foster children with Maryland families. Since that time, the two states
have attempted to negotiate a border agreement, as required by the District of Columbia Family
Court Act of 2001, to expedite the placement of children across state lines, but to date, no such
agreement has been reached. See Sewell Chan, D.C., Md. Reach Deal on Foster Children,
WASH. POST, July 11, 2002, at A11; Sewell Chan, Judge Scolds Md., D.C. on Foster Care,
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2002 at B3; Sewell Chan, Md. Threatens to Return D.C. Foster Children:
Officials Cite District's Paperwork Backlog, Failure to Track Youngsters Placed in Homes in
State, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2002, at B2; Sewell Chan, Md. Threatens to Return Foster
Children to District: Paperwork Backlog, Failure to Track Youths Cited, WASH. POST, Apr. 18,
2002, at B5.
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sions through administrative processes already established under state
law. For aggrieved individuals in states where no such administrative
process exists, the proposed Compact is silent. The proposed Compact
also codifies the current interpretation of the statute that courts have no
authority to review interstate placement decisions. The combination of
vague, undefined standards with inadequate review procedures perpetu-
ates a system in which the exclusive authority to make placement deci-
sions impacting a child's future rests in the personal opinions and beliefs
of a single caseworker.
Unfortunately, much effort has been invested in creating a proposal that
offers few substantive improvements to the current version of the ICPC.
Home studies will continue to be completed in an unreasonably lengthy
time period and the flawed decision-making process will be continued.
The development of this modest proposal reflects a willingness of states
to tolerate the current problems with the ICPC and to perpetuate a system
in which children's lives are indefinitely placed on hold due to unneces-
sary bureaucratic delays and poor decisions. More drastic reforms that
will expedite a child's exit from foster care may disrupt the status quo,
create additional obligations on states, and add financial burdens that the
states are unwilling to accept. But, this is precisely the type of massive
overhaul that is needed to create an interstate decision-making process
that honors the best interests of the child.
V. Reform Proposal
A new model for making interstate placement decisions regarding fos-
ter children must balance a child's interest in promptly resolving place-
ment decisions with the need to access important information about the
proposed placement to make a considered decision. The current system
has failed children in many respects but its greatest flaw has been vesting
overburdened child welfare agencies in receiving states, which have few
resources to invest in the ICPC process, with the exclusive authority to
approve or deny proposed placements. Any proposal that perpetuates this
allocation of responsibility will fail because receiving state agencies have
no incentive to expedite the interstate placement of children and if anything,
have a disincentive to approve placements if they fear that additional obli-
gations will be imposed on them. If these receiving state agencies fail to
fulfill their obligations under the ICPC, jurisdictional issues and lack of
enforcement mechanisms shield them from any accountability. The man-
dated cooperation between beleaguered child welfare agencies in sending
and receiving states has proven to be unworkable, and a new system, pri-
marily relying on private resources, is necessary.
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My proposed reforms restore timeliness, accountability, and oversight
to the interstate placement process. The crux of my solution is as follows.
First, child welfare agencies in the sending state will bear the responsibil-
ity of ensuring that interstate home studies are completed by private or
public child welfare agencies no later than thirty days of a request.
Second, courts in the sending state will retain the authority to make inter-
state placement decisions. Third, after the placement is made, agencies in
the sending state must arrange for a private or public child welfare agency
to monitor the placement. As is currently the case under the Compact, the
sending state will continue to maintain full financial responsibility for the
child and any services she receives after the placement is made.94
How will this new system work? If an out-of-state placement is pro-
posed for a child, the sending state must immediately arrange and pay for
a home study to be completed by either a private or public child welfare
agency in the receiving state. The sending state agency must ensure that
the agency conducting the home study can complete the assessment with-
in thirty days of the request. A thirty-day time period has been endorsed
by the APHSA and federal legislation as the benchmark for how quickly
home studies should be completed. 9 The home study must ascertain
objective facts about the proposed caregiver and her living situation sim-
ilar to facts required in intrastate home studies. For example, specific
information about the caretaker's home, past relationship with the child,
her criminal record, and any child protective history would be particular-
ly relevant. The caseworker conducting the evaluation should include a
statement about whether the potential placement would violate any laws
in the receiving state and may include a recommendation about whether
the placement is in the child's best interests.
Once completed, the home study must be transmitted to the court in the
sending state. The sending state court shall retain the authority to decide
whether the child shall be placed with the proposed caregiver unless the
placement would violate the child placement laws in the receiving state.
The procedures for making this decision shall mirror those for intrastate
placement decisions, except the receiving state agency shall be provided
notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard prior to the making
94. See Article V of the ICPC, reprinted in GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 9 ("The
sending agency shall continue to have financial responsibility for support and maintenance of
the child during the period of the placement").
95. The Secretariat to the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children recommends that ICPC requests be processed within thirty days. Guide
to the ICPC, supra note 10, at 5. In addition, the recently enacted federal legislation defines a
timely home study as one completed within thirty days. 42 U.S.C. § 673(g)(3) (2006).
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of a placement.96 The caseworker who drafted the home study may testify
in the proceeding by telephone if necessary, 97 and the court shall issue its
decision after considering the home study, any additional evidence, and
arguments by the parties and the receiving state. All parties to the child
protective proceeding and the receiving state, aggrieved with the court's
placement decision, can appeal the decision in any manner authorized by
the law in the sending state.
If the sending state agency fails to arrange for the completion of the
home study within thirty days, then the individuals affected by the non-
compliance, including the child and the proposed caretaker, shall have
standing to seek a judicial remedy.98 Possible compliance mechanisms
may include a finding of contempt, financial penalties, orders to reimburse
private agencies to complete home studies, and other forms of equitable
relief, including ordering the interstate placement without a home study if
the court possesses enough information to make a determination that the
best interests of the child necessitate an immediate placement of the child.99
This last remedy may be applicable in many situations due to the ease at
which information relevant to evaluating a caretaker's parenting abilities,
96. Members of the ICPC Development and Drafting Team recommended that judges be
empowered with the ultimate authority to make interstate placement decisions, even over the
receiving state's objection. "[lI]t was the general consensus that the judge in the sending state
should be able to override a recommendation by the receiving state with regard to safety and
suitability of a placement based on the best interests of the child. The judge should also be able
to rule that an out-of-state parent is fit, and to close the case. However, the receiving state should
have a right to be heard in the case if the judge places the child in their state and intends to keep
the case open." American Public Human Services Association, ICPC Development and
Drafting Team First Meeting Summary 8 (July 20-22, 2004), available at http://www.aphsa.
org/Policy/Doc/Summary%20ICPC%20DDT%2OMeeting%201-Rewrite%2OUniverse.pdf.
It is unclear why this proposal was ultimately rejected.
97. The Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, which has been adopt-
ed by over forty states, specifically authorizes courts to take testimony of out-of-state witness-
es by telephone. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1111 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A- 11
(2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-14.1-11 (2006).
98. See Freundlich, supra note 11, at 51-52. Freundlich suggests that one approach to
enforce the ICPC would be to give standing to the child's foster parents and attorney and/or
guardian ad litem in the sending state and to the prospective adoptive parent(s) in the receiving
state to file an action against the public child welfare agency in the receiving state when there
is inaction or administrative mismanagement. Id. at 52. "[T]he knowledge that there is legal
recourse on behalf of waiting children would create an additional incentive for timely and
quality determinations. Id.
99. The ultimate responsibility of dependency courts is to protect the best interests of the
child. As such, a number of courts have overlooked violations of the ICPC when the best inter-
ests of the child warrant such a result. See In re Adoption No. 3598, 701 A.2d 110, 124 (Md.
1997) ("Certainly, the best interest of the child remains the overarching consideration and the
needs of the child should not be subordinate to enforcement of the ICPC."); State of Florida v.
Thornton, 396 S.E.2d 475, 481-82 (W.Va. 1990) ("[W]e certainly do not mean to denigrate the
ICPC or its importance. We merely recognize that when the facts of a case . . . compel the
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such as previous criminal or child protective history, can be obtained elec-
tronically."' Testimony by the potential caretakers at a placement hearing
conducted in the sending state could also yield enough information to sat-
isfy any concerns the court may have regarding the placement.1"'
After the placement is made, the sending state agency shall arrange for
a private or public child welfare agency to monitor the placement and pro-
vide periodic reports to the court with updates on the child's status. As in
the current system, the sending state will retain financial responsibility for
the child after the placement is made. The child's need for expedited deci-
sions about his permanency will trump any bureaucratic or financial obstacle
created by state agencies, and these agencies will be responsible for any
delays in the process.
Under this system, the sending state agency shall bear the sole respon-
sibility for ensuring that the home study is completed within the specified
timeframe. Prior to transmitting the request for a home study, it must locate
an agency in the receiving state that can conduct the assessment within
thirty days. If a public agency cannot complete it within the timeframe,
then the sending state agency must locate a private agency that can do so.
The plethora of private child welfare agencies such as Catholic Charities,
Lutheran Social Services, and Bethany Christian Services that routinely
conduct home studies when licensing foster parents can fill this void and
can also monitor the placements after the children have been placed across
state lines.
States may resist my proposal for several reasons. The proposal elimi-
nates the absolute dominion currently held by state agencies over inter-
exercise of our parens patriae duty to protect a child's best interest, that duty outweighs the
competing interests of abiding by a strict and uncompromising reverence to the Compact.");
State of New Jersey v. K.F., 803 A.2d 721, 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) ("To view the
ICPC as a set of rigid rules would circumvent its goals and the court's ability to achieve those
goals. The court's paramount duty in child welfare cases is to protect the best interests of the
children"). But see In re Ryan R., 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6494 at *1 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006) (reversing placement order, which sent children to grandparents in violation of the ICPC);
In re Melinda D., 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6355 at *14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) ("Well-inten-
tioned efforts of law guardians, placement agencies, and courts to match children with suitable
foster care, particularly for children whose placements are rendered more difficult by virtue of
special needs, must nevertheless comply with the procedural mandates [of the ICPC] to fully
protect the best interests of foster children departing the State.").
100. See In re Lisa B., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1735 at *6 ("Today, so many records are
computerized and the local New York State agency through computer searches and telephone
interviews can obtain almost as much information about the interested relatives as the out-of-
state agencies locate where the relatives reside").
101. See id. at 7 (describing how "the maternal grandfather and his wife traveled to present
themselves to this Court, voluntarily testified before the Court and subjected themselves to
cross-examination. All parties had an opportunity to judge the maternal grandfather's and his
wife's credibility and character in person").
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state placement decisions. Under both the ICPC and the proposed
Compact, the local agency in the receiving state possesses the exclusive
authority to determine whether the child can be placed in that state. Courts
have been divested of any such authority. My reforms strip the agency of
that power and instead invest sending state courts with the power to con-
trol placement decisions. Although my proposal entitles the receiving
state to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the placement deci-
sion being made, the agency no longer controls the process.
This transference of decision-making power makes sense for a number
of reasons. First, under the current Compact, and the proposed Compact,
the receiving state is not financially responsible for the care or supervision
of the child unless the two states explicitly reach an agreement on the
issue.' O2 If no such agreement is reached, the sending state retains full
financial responsibility for the child's maintenance. Since additional obli-
gations are not being imposed on the receiving state, no policy reasons
exist to provide them with the exclusive power to veto placements.
Second, transferring decision-making power from individual caseworkers
in the receiving state to state courts, a forum in which all parties will have
the opportunity to be heard, increases the likelihood that good decisions for
children will be made. The traditional information gathering tools available
to litigants in civil cases-subpoena power and discovery-will ensure that
all relevant information is presented to the court.° 3 Adhering to the rules
of evidence will ensure that the judge bases her decision on credible and
reliable information. Zealous advocacy, including rigorous cross-examina-
tion, will test the veracity of competing allegations.'4 Most importantly,
by being presented with various arguments and counterarguments regarding
where a child should be placed, the court will have a better understanding
102. See Article V of the ICPC, reprinted in GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 10, at 9 ("When
the sending agency is a public agency, it may enter into an agreement with an authorized
public or private agency in the receiving state providing for the performance of one or more
services in respect of such case by the latter as agency for the sending agency").
103. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("[W]here governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings,
the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue").
104. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 n.7 (1989) ("'The age-old tool for ferreting out
truth in the trial process is the right to cross-examination. For two centuries past, the policy of
the Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-
examination as a vital feature of the law"); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990) ("The
theory of the hearsay rule ... is that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustwor-
thiness which may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness can best be brought
to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination"); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269
("In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process
requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses").
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of its options and will make a more informed decision. All of these factors
are missing in the current system and in the proposed Compact, in which
a caseworker, relying on potentially unreliable and untested information,
possesses complete discretion to veto a placement. Though state agencies
will lose power under my reforms, better outcomes for children will result.
States may also resist any change to the status quo that increases their
financial obligations. Completing a home study within thirty days would
radically accelerate the interstate placement of children into permanent
homes, a process which currently takes months, if not years. Undoubtedly,
the change would be costly. Most child welfare agencies already suffer
from a shortage of staff and a limited budget."°5 Completing ICPC home
studies is a low priority compared to other pressing needs such as con-
ducting child abuse investigations.'06 To comply with the new time limits,
public agencies would have to hire more ICPC caseworkers or contract
with private social work agencies to complete the studies. 0 7 States would
also have to contract with out-of-state agencies to monitor the child after
the placement is made. These requirements would impose a significant
financial burden on child welfare agencies, particularly in those areas such
as the District of Columbia that have large numbers of foster children
placed in other jurisdictions. The costs of this reform would create a
disincentive for states to comply with the new mandates.
105. Caseworkers burn out and leave the profession in very high numbers. Ninety percent of
state child welfare agencies report difficulty in recruiting and retaining workers. Sandra Stukes
Chipungu and Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of Contemporary Foster Care,
14 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 83 (2004). The annual turnover rate in the child welfare workforce is
twenty percent for public agencies and forty percent for private agencies. THE ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUNDATION, THE UNSOLVED CHALLENGE OF SYSTEM REFORM: THE CONDITIONS OF THE
FRONTLINE HUMAN SERVICE WORKFORCE (2003). Not surprisingly, federal audits of the foster
care system conducted in 2001 and 2002 found that the majority of states were "not in substan-
tial conformity" with federal child welfare laws. See Ben Kerman, What Is the Child and Family
Service Review? (2003), available at http//www.caseyfamilyservices.org/pdfs/casey-whatis.pdf.
Id. One-third of the states did not have an adequate case review system as required by federal
law. Id. Only five states met the criteria for protecting children from abuse and neglect. Id. None
of the states reviewed satisfied the permanency outcome of providing children with permanency
and stability in their living situations. Id. Ultimately, not one state passed the audit.
106. Child protective agencies receive millions of reports of suspected abuse or neglect each
year, which state laws require be investigated in a specified time period. According to the
National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System, in 2002, individuals made a total of 2.6
million referrals to child protective services, involving 4.5 million children. Child protective
services received more than 50,000 referrals alleging child abuse or neglect on a weekly basis.
Of those referrals investigated by child welfare agencies, 26.8% resulted in a substantiated
report of child maltreatment. Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services,
Child Maltreatment 2002, at 5, available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/
cm02/cm02.pdf.
107. A number of courts have suggested that states utilize private agencies to complete inter-
state home studies in a timely manner. See In re Johnny S., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 101 (Ct. App.
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This disincentive could be eliminated if federal funding became avail-
able to reimburse states for the costs associated with the interstate place-
ment process, mainly the completion of home studies and monitoring of
out-of-state placements. These funds could be administered through Title
IV-E of the Social Security Act, the pool of funds that is used to reimburse
states for the costs of children in foster care, and the money could be con-
ditioned on states complying with the specific proposals outlined above.
The federal government has utilized this approach repeatedly to reform
state child protection systems on issues such as providing services to parents,
expediting permanency decisions, and finalizing adoptions. °8 The success
of this approach would hinge on the willingness of federal lawmakers to
allocate enough funds to cover the costs of the placement process.
Many of these financial costs would be offset by accelerating the place-
ment of children into permanent homes. 09 Currently, while children await
interstate placements with parents or relatives, they languish in temporary
foster homes and institutional settings, costly placements funded by the
state with substantial reimbursement from the federal government."1
0
Once the children are placed with their family, however, the expenditures
on foster care would diminish because many relatives are not licensed and
are therefore ineligible to receive a subsidy. In addition, expediting the
child's interstate placement will move the child closer to permanency and
once a permanency option such as adoption or guardianship is finalized,
1995); In re Markelle T., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5676 at * 19 (Ct. App. Cal. 2003) (both
observing that California could enter into contracts with out-of-state agencies to conduct home
studies in lieu of the ICPC process); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(26)(A)(3)(a) (recognizing that
"[i]t is the sense of Congress that each State should use private agencies to conduct home studies").
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq. for a list of conditions imposed by federal law on states
seeking to receive federal foster care funding.
109. See Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, H.R. 5403: Safely and Timely
Interstate Placement of Children Act of 2006 (May 19, 2006) (observing that the placement of
foster children in permanent homes out-of-state may result "in savings to the federal govern-
ment by reducing the sending state's claims for foster care expenses under the IV-E program").
110. Each year, states disburse approximately $10 billion in federal and state funds to pay
for housing and support services for children in foster care. See Rob Geen, Anna Sommers, and
Mindy Cohen, Medicaid Spending on Foster Children, 2 CHILD WELFARE RES. PROGRAM 1
(Urban Institute, Aug. 2005); Urban Institute, The Cost of Protecting Vulnerable Children, I
CARING FOR CHILDREN I (Nov. 2002). States spend an additional $1.8 billion on administering
the child welfare system. Id. The costs of placements vary by state and by type of placement.
For example, in New York City, it costs roughly $28 a day for the city to keep a child in foster
care. See Leslie Kaufman, Bill to Save Foster Care Costs Is Stalled in the Legislature, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2004 at B2. A North Carolina study revealed the following costs for children's
foster care placements: $12.01 (family foster care); $66.30 (specialized foster care); $132.86
(small group home); $129.93 (large group home); and $148.17 (emergency and other place-
ments). Barth et al., A Comparison of the Governmental Costs of Long-Term Foster Care and
Adoption, 80 Soc. SERV. REV. 127, 136 (2006). After a child is placed with an extended family
member, these costs would disappear.
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the child protective case can be closed."' At that point, the costs associ-
ated with funding caseworkers, attorneys, and the court system would dis-
appear. In the long run, moving children from short-term licensed place-
ments into permanent homes with their families would lessen the financial
burden on the child welfare system.
Regardless of the costs of this system, financial considerations cannot
serve as an excuse to perpetuate the impermanence of foster children.1"2
The importance of permanency for foster children is a double-edged sword
imposing obligations on both parents and state agencies. The law is clear
that parents have a very limited time to reunify with their children before
other permanent options are pursued. 13 In most situations, parents must
prove their rehabilitation within this time frame even if the agency fails to
provide them with needed services.1 14 Equally important, however, is the
state's responsibility to move children out of temporary settings and into
long-term, stable, family-like settings that could serve as a permanent
home should the parent fail to meet her goals.115 The most important con-
sideration for the dependency court is the child's sense of time, not the
difficulty of the parties in accessing or providing needed services in the
11. Approximately 5.5 percent of foster children reside in a state other than the one respon-
sible for their care and protection. UNDERSTANDING DELAYS, supra note 25, at 3. While some of
these children are placed in foster and adoptive homes, the largest proportion is placed with
close relatives in other states. Id. Statistics indicate that most of these interstate placements lead
to permanency for children. Id. Two-thirds of children placed in another state remain with the
families with whom they were placed. Id.
112. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected a state's interest in financial savings as a
justification for depriving children of familial relationships. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 29 (1981) ("But though the State's pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is
hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here"); Boddie,
401 U.S. at 381 (finding that State's financial considerations are not sufficient to overcome
plaintiff's interest in dissolving a marriage); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 122 (1996) (mini-
mizing importance of State's financial interests when compared to right of parent to preserve
relationship with her child.).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006) (requiring States to file petitions to terminate parental
rights if the child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months sub-
ject to several exceptions); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2006) (mandating that a permanency planning
be held no later than one year after a child's entry in foster care.).
114. See In re L.L., 653 A.2d 873, 882 (D.C. 1995) ("We reiterate that the overriding con-
sideration is the best interest of the child, which may compel the filing of a motion to terminate
parental rights regardless of the defaults of public agencies in seeking reunification of the fam-
ily"); In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 355 (D.C. 1992) ("[E]ven if, as [the judge] suggested in her
order denying the TPR, the social workers might have been more cooperative,... the remedy
cannot be to prohibit an adoption which is demonstrably in [the child's] interest; the child can-
not be punished for the alleged wrongs of the bureaucracy"). But see 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(iii)
(2006) (permitting States to postpone filing of termination petition if services have not been pro-
vided to the parents).
115. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text for a discussion on the importance the law
places on children achieving permanency.
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case. 116 Without legally enforceable deadlines, states will continue to
impede the placement of children into permanent homes and instead chil-
dren will continue to suffer in temporary foster homes or institutional
placements.
How would Tasha, the child described at the outset of this article, fare
under my system? First, a home study of her aunt would have been com-
pleted within thirty days. Second, if the study was not completed within
the timeframe, Tasha, through her lawyer-guardian ad litem or her pater-
nal aunt, could have filed a motion to compel the sending state agency to
comply with the statute or pay a private agency to complete the home
study. Finally, if Tasha's best interests warranted an immediate placement
without compliance with the ICPC-as it did-then the court would have
had the authority to order the placement. Tasha would not have lan-
guished in an institutional setting for six months due to bureaucratic
delays. Her best interests would have dictated her long-term placement.
The straightforward proposal outlined above can serve as a guide to
revamp the ICPC. This new system comprised of timely home studies,
judicial decision-making, and accountability will ensure that expedited
placement decisions are made for foster children living in temporary
placements. This system will also honor the rights of the parties to the
proceeding, who will be given an opportunity to be heard prior to the
issuance of interstate placement decisions, and recourse through appellate
review should they disagree with the decision. Providing litigants with
these procedural rights will only bolster their faith in the decision-making
process and enhance the legitimacy of the child welfare system. At a time
when public confidence in the system is waning, these important consid-
erations cannot be minimized.
VI. Conclusion
Benign motives, primarily the need for child welfare agencies and
courts to access information about potential placements in other states, led
to the passage of the ICPC. Over time, however, the benefits of the statute
have been corrupted by bureaucratic impediments, poor decision-making
and a lack of accountability that have resulted in children unnecessarily
remaining in temporary foster homes or institutional placements. Drastic
116. See Freundlich, supra note 11, at 51 ("Enforcement should be viewed in terms of the
rights of children who are being served by the interstate approval process. . . . Enforcement
should take the form of financial incentives that reward timely, quality assessments and finan-
cial penalties that result when mandatory time lines are not met, approvals are arbitrarily with-
held, or evaluations are inadequate to permit the sending state to determine the appropriateness
of the proposed placement").
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change to this system is needed, but unfortunately the reform proposals
generated by the states and the federal government fall short. Instead, a
new cooperative framework is needed in which home studies are con-
ducted in a timely manner consistent with the developmental needs of
children and decisions are made by courts after considering evidence
submitted by all parties. These changes will expedite the placement of
children into permanent homes.
